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INTRODUCTION 
The extraordinary rise in the last decade of Chinese 
investment in Africa1 continues to be a subject of profound 
curiosity.2 That is largely because it defies the centuries-old 
norm on who invests where. Traditionally, the bulk of foreign 
investment had flowed North-South but rarely South-South.3 
Whenever and wherever it occurred, the means of its protection 
ranged from direct military intervention4 to a bona fide and 

1. Detailed information on China-Africa economic relations is available on the 
official website of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (“FOCAC”) at 
http://www.focac.org/eng. 
2. See, e.g., David Smith, Hillary Clinton Launches African Tour with Veiled Attack on 
China, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 1, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
aug/01/hillary-clinton-africa-china (“Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, has 
started an 11-day tour of Africa by contrasting America’s commitment to democracy 
and human rights with rival powers’ focus on exploiting resources. Although Clinton 
did not mention any country by name, her remarks will be widely interpreted as a swipe 
at China, which eclipsed the US as Africa’s biggest trading partner three years ago.”). A 
growing academic literature covers this subject. See generally DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE 
DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA 308 (2009) (“Where the West 
regularly changes its development advice, programs, and approach in Africa . . . China 
does not claim to know what Africa must do to develop. China has argued that it was 
wrong to impose political and economic conditionality in exchange for aid, and that 
countries should be free to find their own pathway out of poverty.”); CHRIS ALDEN, 
CHINA IN AFRICA (2007); CHINA INTO AFRICA: TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE (Robert I. 
Rotberg ed., 2008); CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: A RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT 
EMBRACE (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008); SARAH RAINE, CHINA’S AFRICAN CHALLENGES 
(Tim Huxley ed., 2009); DAVID H. SHINN & JOSHUA EISENMAN, CHINA AND AFRICA: A 
CENTURY OF ENGAGEMENT (2012); IAN TAYLOR, CHINA AND AFRICA: ENGAGEMENT AND 
COMPROMISE (2006).  
3. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN AFRICA REPORT 2010: SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION—AFRICA AND THE NEW FORMS OF 
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP 24–25, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2010, U.N. 
Sales No. E.10.II.D.13 (Norbert Lebale et al. eds, June 18, 2010) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT], available at http://
unctad.org/en/Docs/aldcafrica2010_en.pdf. In development discourses, the terms 
“North” and “South” are typically used to signify the level of development of countries. 
All African countries ordinarily fall under the South category. Id. at 1. 
4. See, e.g., Louis T. Wells, Preface to THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
REGIME, at xvi (José E. Alvarez et al. eds., 2011) (“In the rather distant past, the United 
States and other rich countries would occasionally act militarily or insist on state-state 
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equitable legal framework.5 China had experienced the full 
range of treatments in its long history of dealings with the West,6 
as had Africa.7 Although they went through the spectrum of 
experiences independently, they seem to have been exposed to 
the same set of evolving principles at about the same time in 
varying degrees.8 
In the Twenty-first Century, International Investment 
Agreements (“IIAs”), particularly Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(“BITs”), have become the principal means of protection of 
foreign investment.9 These investment treaties themselves lay 
along a spectrum representing the balance of power of their 
own era. For example, the recently announced 2012 US BIT 
Model, which is the fourth model, may be taken as an 
approximate representation of the most contemporary 

arbitrations when their investors claimed mistreatment abroad. Later, the United States 
would threaten (and occasionally act) to cut off aid, vote against loans by multilateral 
financial institutions to offending countries, and cancel trade preferences . . . .”). 
5. The negotiated legal framework is dominated by Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(“BITs”) in recent times. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
554–55 (2d ed. 2008). 
6. See JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-
INVESTED ENTERPRISES 41–54 (3d ed, 2010). Most notable are the “unequal treaties” 
signed between China and the major Western powers including the United States, 
Great Britain, and France, which gave these countries extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
China in matters involving their own citizens. Id. at 41–44. Currently, China has a web 
of at least 126 duly negotiated BITs with a wide range of countries, including many 
European countries. NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 31 (2009). 
7. See RICHARD ROBERTS & KRISTIN MANN, Law in Colonial Africa, in LAW IN 
COLONIAL AFRICA 10 (1991) (“In the first half of the nineteenth century, the balance 
of power between Europeans and Africans shifted decisively in favor of the Europeans. 
Industrialization had widened the material and technological gap between their 
cultures. Europeans began to feel confident for the first time that on the African coasts, 
if not in the interior, they could impose their will, by force if necessary.”). Currently, 
most African states order their investment relations through BITs. 
8. See WON KIDANE, CHINA-AFRICA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE LAW, CULTURE AND 
ECONOMICS OF ARBITRATION 173–76, 188–95 (2011). For a thorough discussion of the 
evolution of international investment law, see LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 469–94. 
9. LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 554; L. Yves Fortier, The Canadian Approach to 
Investment Protection: How Far We Have Come!, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 525, 528 (Christina 
Bender et al. eds., 2009) (“BITs emerged as a tool in the Cold War period to promote 
FDI in developing countries.”). 
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compromises that the United States is willing to make.10 China’s 
BITs have also gone through at least three generational 
modifications.11 China has employed all three generations to 
protect its investment in Africa. Do China’s BITs tell a story of a 
nation’s rapid transformation from a recipient of Foreign Direct 
Investment (“FDI”) to a sender of FDI? Or do they paint a more 
complicated picture? 
China’s approach to investment in Africa is said to be 
different from the approaches that Africa’s traditional partners 
from Europe and North America have taken over the years. A 
2010 UN Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) 
report describes such difference in the following terms: 
[I]n contrast to Africa’s relationship with traditional 
partners, the new partnerships often have established 
forums and dialogue platforms and are generally supported 
by frequent high-level official visits. Furthermore, they are 
based on the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of partner countries. Consequently, they are not 
associated with policy conditionality as has been the case in 
relations with traditional partners.12 
It states further that:  
the big Southern partners [mainly China] generally use 
official flows to promote trade and investment activities in 
Africa. Furthermore, Southern partners do not consider 
their financial contributions to other developing countries 
as aid. Rather they describe them as ‘expressions of 
solidarity and cooperation borne out of shared experiences 
and sympathies.’13 
Although the role of China’s involvement in Africa remains 
a subject of great controversy and heated debate,14 it is clear that 

10. Office of theU.S. Trade Representative, 2012 United States Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty [hereinafter U.S. 2012 Model BIT], available at http://
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pd. 
11. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 35. 
12. UNCTAD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT, supra note 3, at 24. 
13. Id. 
14. See, e.g., The Chinese in Africa: Trying to Pull Together, Africans Are Asking Whether 
China Is Making Their Lunch or Eating It, ECONOMIST (U.K.), Apr. 20, 2010, http://
www.economist.com/node/18586448/print (evaluating the competing arguments). 
The Economist hosts an ongoing online scholarly debate on Chinese involvement in 
Africa. See Africa and China, ECONOMIST (U.K.), http://www.economist.com/debate/
overview/165 (last visited May 1, 2014). As of May 1, 2014, the score is 59% to 41% in 
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Africa’s recent and unprecedented growth is not entirely 
unrelated to Chinese investment and trade.15 Be that as it may, 
China’s economic interest in Africa is not all that different from 
Africa’s traditional partners. Its means of pursuing its economic 
goals are also similar, although, as Ambassador David Shinn puts 
it, China employs different tactics which might make it more 
acceptable to Africa. In his own words: 
[T]he United States and China use essentially the same 
political, economic, military and cultural tools for 
implementing their relations with Africa. The emphasis the 
two countries place on these tactics, however, and the way 
they implement policy varies considerably. China presents 
itself more humbly in its interaction with Africa. Having 
served as the leader of the Western world since the end of 
the Second World War and the only superpower since the 
end of the Cold War, the United States often comes across 
in Africa as insensitive . . . .16 

favor of Chinese involvement in Africa. See id. A New York Times Op-Ed Piece has also 
discussed China’s intentions in Africa: 
Despite all the scaremongering, China’s motives for investing in Africa are 
actually quite pure. To satisfy China’s population and prevent a crisis of 
legitimacy for their rule, leaders in Beijing need to keep economic growth 
rates high and continue to bring hundreds of millions of people out of 
poverty. And to do so, China needs arable land, oil and minerals. Pursuing 
imperial or colonial ambitions with masses of impoverished people at home 
would be wholly irrational and out of sync with China’s current strategic 
thinking. 
Moreover, the evidence does not support a claim that Africans themselves 
feel exploited. To the contrary, China’s role is broadly welcomed across the 
continent. A 2007 Pew Research Center survey of 10 sub-Saharan African 
countries found that Africans overwhelmingly viewed Chinese economic 
growth as beneficial. In virtually all countries surveyed, China’s involvement 
was viewed in a much more positive light than America’s; in Senegal, 86 
percent said China’s role in their country helped make things better, 
compared with 56 percent who felt that way about America’s role. In Kenya, 
91 percent of respondents said they believed China’s influence was positive, 
versus only 74 percent for the United States. 
Dambisa Moyo, Op-Ed., Beijing, a Boon for Africa, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/opinion/beijing-a-boon-for-africa.html. 
15. KIDANE, supra note 8, at 3–4 & n.3. 
16. Id. at 18 (quoting David H. Shinn, Adjunct Professor, George Wash. Univ., 
Comparing Engagement with Africa by China and the United States at the China in 
Africa Symposium (Mar. 6–7, 2009), available at https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/
bitstream/handle/2022/3466/China%20in%20Africa%20Symposium%20-%20the%
20good%20one.pdf?sequence%C2%BC1). 
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The current China-Africa economic engagement is full of 
benefits and risks arguably to both sides.17 The legal 
infrastructure for the management of such risks is in a state of 
development. The principal legal instruments designed for this 
purpose are the BITs that China has already entered into with 
thirty-three African States.18 The principal objective of this 
Article is to analyze and contextualize these BITs in light of 
contemporary international investment law as represented by 
the 2012 US BIT Model as well as most current non-
governmental models, mainly the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (“IISD”) Model.19 By so doing, the 
Article presents a critical appraisal of the various Chinese BIT 
models and proposes certain important modifications that 
account for the unique circumstances of China-Africa 
investment relations. 
This introduction is followed by a concise description of 
Chinese and African traditional conceptions of the ordering of 
economic affairs by law, in order to set the stage for a more 
detailed discussion of the evolution, doctrinal foundation, and 
contents of the existing legal framework in Part II. Part III 
juxtaposes the current China-Africa BITs against the most recent 
US and IISD BIT models and attempts to identify useful 
contemporary formulations and normative supplements. Part IV 
provides a summary of conclusions and recommendations. 

17. UNCTAD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA REPORT, supra note 3, at 3 
(“Despite the potential benefits to Africa from South–South cooperation, it should be 
noted that the new partnerships also present challenges for the region. For example, 
there are concerns that it could result in a deterioration of governance and 
environmental quality and also hamper efforts to achieve debt sustainability in the 
region. Given these concerns, it is clear that the ultimate impact of South–South 
cooperation in Africa will depend on the extent to which African countries are able to 
maximize the benefits while minimizing any potential risks.”). 
18. For a list of China’s BITs with all countries as of June 1, 2013, see Full List of 
Bilateral Investment Agreements, UNCTAD (June 1, 2013) http:// unctad.org/Sections/
dite_pcbb/docs/bits_china.pdf. Thirty-two out of the more than 120 Chinese BITs are 
with African states. Of the 32, 13 have come into effect. Id. But see Bilateral Investment 
Treaty, CHINESE MINISTRY COM. (Nov 15, 2011), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/
article/bilateralchanges/201309/20130900300306.shtml (listing fifteen China-Africa 
BITs having come into effect).  
19.  Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., IISD Model International Agreement on 
Investment (Apr. 2005), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_
agreement.pdf [hereinafter IISD BIT Model]. 
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I. CHINESE AND AFRICAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ORDERING 
OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BY LAW 
The widespread reception in the Eastern world and Africa 
of Western notions of law and legal institutions in the last 
century gives the appearance that, by now, such notions are 
deeply ingrained in the legal cultures of these societies. 
Although there is a grain of substance to the appearance, a 
closer look suggests that the respective societies’ indigenous 
notions about the role of law and legal institutions in ordering 
human behavior in general and economic relations in particular 
remain significant.20 As a background to the detailed discussion 
of the doctrinal foundations and contents of the various 
generations of China-Africa BITs in the next Part, this Part 
discusses the differences in legal cultures and puts the 
contemporary China-Africa efforts in ordering their investment 
relations by law in context. 
A. The Conception of Law and Legal Obligations in China 
An attempt to systematically unpack the various historical 
influences that have shaped the Chinese legal culture is a 
difficult and unnecessary exercise for purposes of this Article. It 
is important to note, however, that the current Chinese legal 
culture is a product of centuries of domestic and foreign 
philosophical influences. The most well-recognized of all 
influences is that of Confucian legal thought.21 The principal 
assumptions underlying this thought include: positive law 
encourages the evasion of rules and does not encourage proper 
behavior and fails to bring about harmony; good behavior 
cannot be imposed but must come from within the person; 
emphasis must be placed on the duties of the person rather than 
his rights; social hierarchy must be respected as it is the key to 
stability; inability to resolve disputes amicably is a sign of 

20. See RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 559–76 (3d ed. 1985); 
see also Philip J. McConnaughay, Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-West 
Commercial Relationships, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 427, 431 (2001). 
21. See generally JOHN W. HEAD & YANPING WANG, LAW CODES IN DYNASTIC CHINA: 
A SYNOPSIS OF CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY IN THE THIRTY CENTURIES FROM ZHOU TO QING 
32–52 (2005). 
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weakness and law suits must be avoided as much as possible; and 
the application of positive law often leads to arbitrary justice.22 
As Professor James Nafziger writes: 
[T]he Confucian ideal of harmony on earth, where no 
aberrant behavior will occur, led to an initially elitist 
etiquette of propriety (li) that increasingly influenced the 
entire Chinese legal system. On the other hand, for the 
common people, the Chinese Legalists offered the 
deterrent of positive law (fa). As time went on, the two 
concepts fused. This fusion has survived with alternating 
emphasis on fa and li through the dramatic history of the 
Middle Kingdom. Today, the Chinese continue to be 
concerned about propriety and attitudinal change just as 
they are intent on rapidly developing formal codes of law.23 
Chinese legal culture is also a product of years of foreign 
influences.24 External influences came in many different forms, 
some welcome, others not. Most notable are the extraterritorial 
privileges, which exempted foreign nationals in China from 
Chinese legal process and subjected them to their home states’ 
laws25 and related Western demand for reform as well as 
Marxism-Leninism,26 and investment-related legal reforms 
following China’s opening up its economy for foreign 
investment in 1978.27 Despite such foreign influences, the 
traditional notions still predominate. As Dean McConnaughay 

22. See generally ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 36–38. For a more complete account, 
see HEAD & WANG, supra note 21. 
23. James A. R. Nafziger & Ruan Jiafang, Chinese Methods of Resolving International 
Trade, Investment, and Maritime Disputes, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 619, 624 (1987). 
24. See generally GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE 
LAW 1–17 (1996); Weng Li, Philosophical Influences on Contemporary Chinese Law, 6 IND. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 327, 327–35 (1996). 
25. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 42. Citizens of Russia, Great Britain, the United 
States, France, Sweden, Norway, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, 
Italy, Austria-Hungary, Peru, Brazil, Portugal, Japan, Mexico, and Switzerland had such 
privileges at different times. Id. at 42–43 n.17 (citing Harold Scott Quigley, 
Extraterritoriality in China, 20 AM. J. IN’T’L. L. 46, 51 n.21 (1926)). See Shih Shun Liu, 
Extraterritoriality: Its Rise and Its Decline, in STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC 
LAW 840 (1925) for a discussion of the concept. 
26. Following the takeover of the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) in 1949, the 
Chinese version of Marxism and Leninism became dominant. At its core, it disfavored 
the use of law and legal institutions for the ordering of any affairs. See ZIMMERMAN, 
supra note 6, at 51–53. 
27. See id. at 41–54. For more discussion on the post-Mao reforms in China, see 
STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 3–4 (1999). 
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puts it, despite long-standing commercial relations with the 
West, “[t]he penetration in Asian societies of Western legal 
traditions and values is not deep.”28 One of the reasons 
McConnaughay cites is that: 
[N]ot only was law traditionally not a significant factor with 
respect to the ordering and performance of commercial 
relationships in Asia, its relatively recent enactment and 
application to this sphere of activity was essentially 
externally inspired as a condition of commerce with the 
West and, as such, unaccompanied by the fundamental 
change in individual attitudes and values essential to the 
determinative role of law and contracts in commercial 
affairs in the West.29  
It is with this important note that China’s attempt to use law 
to order its investment relations with Africa must be understood. 
In fact, as will be elaborated further in subsequent Parts, this 
might partly explain China’s approach to the signing and 
utilization, or the lack thereof, of investment treaties with 
African states. 
B. The Conceptions of Law and Legal Obligations in Africa 
As Judge Elias puts it, in pre-colonial African societies, 
customary law “strives consciously to reconcile the disputants in 
a lawsuit, [unlike] English law [which] often tends to limit itself 
to the bare resolution of the conflict by stopping at the mere 
apportionment of blame as between the disputants.”30  With the 
advent of colonialism, however, as Roberts and Mann suggest, 
“material advancement and evangelical revival strengthened the 
belief of most Europeans in the moral superiority of their own 
civilization. Westerners equated standard of morality with 
standard of living, and they found both wanting in Africa.”31 
They add further that: 
The new faith of Europeans in the moral and material 
superiority of their own civilization convinced them that 
exporting their culture would be good for Africans. Trade 

28. McConnaughay, supra note 20, at 431. 
29. Id. 
30. T. OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 268–89 (1956). 
31. ROBERTS & MANN, supra note 7.  
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in agricultural commodities and conversion to Christian 
religion were, of course, to be the agents of change. 
These fundamental shifts in the relationship between 
Africans and Europeans affected the character of legal 
interaction between them . . . . Merchants, missionaries, and 
officials began to assume that the spread of Western legal 
arrangements was necessary to the growth of trade and 
civilization. They wanted new authorities and institutions to 
regulate their dealings with local people.32 
The colonial powers, of course, maintained dual systems of 
law for the natives and the Europeans throughout Africa. And in 
this dualism, as Professor Táíwò explains, “there was no interest 
on the part of those responsible for its introduction to plant the 
whole seed from which a fully grown plant might have been 
cultivated. Nor was there any chance that an organic system 
could have been [cultivated].”33 The result was a total 
disorientation upon the arrival of independence. Professor René 
David describes it well when he says, “[t]he colonial powers did 
declare, as a matter of principle, their intention to respect 
customary law, but the actual measures implemented with a view 
to guaranteeing its application resulted in its complete 
deformation.”34 
Finally, as Judge Elias concludes, “it is at least doubtful 
whether complete uniformity will ever be achieved.”35 However, 
the impact of Western legal cultures on existing legal cultures in 
Africa is evident.36 But again, it is important to keep in mind 
that, similar to the Chinese legal culture, African legal culture 
emphasizes harmony: “[R]ather than . . . the strict enforcement 

32. Id. at 11. 
33. OLÚFÉMI TÁÍWÒ, HOW COLONIALISM PREEMPTED MODERNITY IN AFRICA 169 
(2010). This is because the rule of law “originated as a . . . weapon in the arsenal of the 
colonial authorities for the singular purpose of keeping the colonies and protectorates 
safe for the colonizers and the natives in their place.” Id. For a similar argument, see 
Robert J. Gordon, The White Man’s Burden: Ersatz Customary Law and Internal Pacification 
in South Africa, in FOLK LAW 367, 387 (Alison Dundes Renteln & Alan Dundes eds., 
1994) (“Power is at its most durable and intense when running silently through the 
repetition of institutionalized practices . . . [serving] as grids which officials can use to 
justify, sort, order and reorder the elements of power they have.”). 
34. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 20, at 561. 
35. ELIAS, supra note 30, at 274. 
36. For the specific aspects of the impact, see id. at 274–301. 
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of law, its purpose[] [is] to reconcile the parties and to restore 
harmonious relations within the community.”37 
C. The Ordering of China-Africa Economic Relations by Law: 
Contemporary Efforts 
In recent years, headline news around the world routinely 
announces multi-billion dollar deals between China and African 
partners.38 With a tenfold increase in the last decade alone, the 
amount of trade between China and Africa stood at US$166 
billion by 2012,39 surpassing Africa’s trade with the United States 
as of 2009.40 
Africa has become a preferred destination for Chinese 
investment as well. As of July 2012, about 2000 Chinese 
enterprises had collectively invested US$15 billion in Africa, 
which is expected to grow exponentially in the coming years.41 
For example, the first China-Africa forum for local government 
cooperation in 2012 welcomed 1700 delegates from forty 
African countries to China.42  As indicated above, the Fifth 
FOCAC Summit concluded by committing US$20 billion in 
credit for Africa in three years. The most recent policy 
pronouncement with respect to investment is contained in the 

37. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 20, at 551. 
38. See, e.g., China Pledges $20bn in Credit for Africa at Summit, BBC NEWS (July 19, 
2012, 2:03 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18897451. 
39. See H.E. Hu Jintao, President of the People’s republic of China, Speech at the 
Opening Ceremony of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (July 19, 2012) [hereinafter FOCAC Speech], available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/china/2012-07/19/c_131725637.htm; Wang 
Xiaotian, Trade between China, Africa Strengthening, CHINA DAILY (July 19, 2012), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-07/19/content_15599626.htm (“Trade 
between China and Africa reached $160 billion in 2011, up by 28 percent from the 
previous year, according to the most recent data released by the Ministry of Commerce. 
In the past 10 years, bilateral trade has been growing at an average pace of 33.6 percent 
per year.”). According to a report from the Ministry of Commerce, China, the trade 
volume between China and Africa in 2012 was US$198.5 billion. See MINISTRY OF 
COMMERCE, China-Africa Trade Volume Reached New Height (Apr. 18, 2013, 11:31 AM), 
http://finance.china.com.cn/news/gnjj/20130418/1397454.shtml. 
40. Moyo, supra note 14. 
41. See FOCAC Speech, supra note 39. 
42. Mu Xuequan, Chinese Entrepreneurs Urged to Help Boost Sino-African Ties, 
FOCAC (Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/jmhz/t964316.htm. 
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latest Ministerial Action Plan for the years 2013–2015 issued at 
the conclusion of the Fifth Beijing Ministerial conference.43 

43. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan, Beijing, China, July 23, 2012 
[hereinafter Fifth FOCAC Action Plan], available at http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/
t954620.htm. It reads in full: 
4.2 Investment and Enterprise Cooperation 
4.2.1 The two sides expressed satisfaction with the steady growth of two-way 
investment between China and Africa, especially the fast increase of China’s 
investment in Africa in broader areas since the Fourth Ministerial Conference 
of FOCAC in 2009. They maintain that this helps intensify economic links 
between the two sides and boost local economic development and 
employment. 
4.2.2 The two sides promised to continue to encourage and support mutual 
investment, and will actively explore new areas and ways to expand 
investment cooperation. The two sides will continue to push forward 
negotiations and implementation of bilateral agreements on promoting and 
protecting investment, foster an enabling investment environment and 
safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of investors of both sides. 
4.2.3 The Chinese government will continue to encourage and support 
capable and reputable Chinese companies to invest in Africa, and guide 
Chinese companies to establish processing and manufacturing bases in 
Africa, help raise the added value of African exports, and increase investment 
in such service sectors as business services, transport, consulting and 
management to raise the level and quality of cooperation. 
4.2.4 The Chinese side will continue to make good use of the China-Africa 
Development Fund and gradually scale it up to US$5 billion to strengthen 
China-Africa cooperation. 
4.2.5 The Chinese side will continue to support the development of 
overseas business cooperation zones established in Africa and, in addition to 
helping entry of Chinese and African enterprises into the zones, support 
them in fitting into the strategic focus of the zones to realize faster utilization 
of the zones so that they contribute towards rapid industrialization and 
economic restructuring in Africa. China will encourage enterprises joining 
the zones to increase links with local enterprises and communities, 
strengthen technology and experience sharing on the shop floor and 
enhance technology transfer and job creation. 
4.2.6 The Chinese side will continue to strengthen cooperation with Africa 
on technology and management, step up technological support and 
experience sharing and help African countries enhance their capability for 
independent development. 
4.2.7 The two sides noted the positive outcomes of the Fourth Conference 
of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs and will further encourage the 
business communities of the two sides to strengthen cooperation. The 
Chinese government will continue to guide Chinese enterprises to actively 
fulfill social responsibilities and give back to the local communities. 
4.3 Infrastructure Construction 
4.3.1 The two sides agreed to prioritize infrastructure in China-Africa 
cooperation and strengthen cooperation in transport, telecommunications, 
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The most important highlights are: the commitment to 
negotiate and implement bilateral investment agreements which 
are designed to promote and protect investment showing the 
increased importance that they have assigned to these treaties; 
the plan to raise the China-Africa investment fund to US$5 
billion; the continuation of the building of economic zones44 to 
foster rapid economic growth; and the provision of preferential 
loans to Chinese companies for infrastructure development. 
These commitments show that Chinese investment in Africa will 
continue at a much higher rate and that the investment is 
supposed to be protected by law, specifically by bilateral 
investment treaties. 
II. THE DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN CHINA-AFRICA INVESTMENT 
RELATIONS 
Apart from the “soft law”45 commitments enshrined in the 
FOCAC Declarations and Action Plans,46 the most important 

radio and television, water conservancy, electricity, energy and other areas of 
infrastructure development. 
4.3.2 To support Africa in achieving connectivity and integration and 
developing more integrated infrastructure, China and the African Union will 
establish a cooperative partnership in the design, inspection, financing and 
management of projects under the Program for Infrastructure Development 
in Africa and the Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative, 
strengthen relevant dialogue and exchanges, and provide support for the 
project planning and feasibility study. 
4.3.3 The Chinese government will continue to encourage capable Chinese 
enterprises and financial institutions to participate in transnational and trans-
regional infrastructure construction in Africa and provide preferential loans 
to support infrastructure building in Africa. 
Id. 
44. Special Chinese Economic Zones (“SEZs”) are being built throughout Sub-
Saharan Africa. Five such zones have already been approved and are under 
construction. See Deborah Brautigam et al., China’s Investment in African Special Economic 
Zones: Prospects, Challenges, and Opportunities, WORLD BANK ECON. PREMISE, Mar. 2010, at 
1.  
45. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “soft law” as “[c]ollectively, rules that are 
neither strictly binding nor completely lacking in legal significance.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1193 (9th ed. 2009). For a detailed discussion of the “soft law”–“hard law” 
distinction and significance, see Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft 
Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 706, 707–08 (2010). 
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sources of law in China-Africa investment relations are the 
existing thirty-five BITs. At least sixteen of the thirty-three have 
already come into effect.47  Before the provisions of these BITs 
are analyzed in detail in Part III below, it is important to 
consider the doctrinal foundation and the dilemma that 
continues to afflict them as China attempts to balance its role as 
a recipient of Western investment and as a sender of an 
increasing amount of investment to Africa. 
A. The Doctrinal Dilemma and Evolution of China-Africa BITs 
The greatest dilemma in foreign investment has always 
been the extent of protection that such investment must get. 
This Part looks at these issues vis-à-vis China-Africa investment 
relations. 
1. The Doctrinal Dilemma 
In 1938, writing to the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Mexico in relation to Mexico’s expropriation of agrarian 
property owned by Americans, US Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull said: 
The taking of property without compensation is not 
expropriation. It is confiscation . . . . We cannot question 
the right of a foreign government to treat its own nationals 
in this fashion if it so desires. This is a matter of domestic 
concern. But we cannot admit that a foreign government 
may take the property of American nationals in disregard of 
the rule of compensation under international law.48 
Mexico obviously rejected any notion that foreign nationals 
could have superior property rights,49 endorsing what is 

46. All of the declarations and Action Plans of the last ten years containing 
commitments on trade and investment are available on the FOCAC website at 
http://www.focac.org/eng/. 
47. All the China-Africa BITs and their statuses are listed on the official website of 
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Commerce at http:// english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/
bilateralchanges/201309/20130900300306.shtml. 
48. Letter from U.S. Secretary of State to Mexican Ambassador to the United 
States (July 21, 1938), excerpted in LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 476–77. 
49. Id. at 477 (“My Government maintains [that] . . . there does not exist in 
international law any principle universally accepted by countries, not by the writers of 
treatises on this subject, that would render obligatory the giving of adequate 
compensation for expropriations of a general and impersonal character. Nevertheless, 
2014] CHINA-AFRICA INVESTMENT TREATIES 1049 
commonly called the Calvo Doctrine, which rejects any notion 
that foreign investors could have a better right to property than 
nationals.50 As the US Supreme Court noted in Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino,51 “[t]here are few if any issues in international 
law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the 
limitations on a state’s power to expropriate the property of 
aliens.”52 This question is rooted in the varying conceptions of 
the function of the right to private property itself. The 
conceptions range from the purely laissez-faire function of 
private property which gained its best articulation in a series of 
cases that the US Supreme Court passed in an era dubbed the 
Lochner era.53  Highly influenced by Western enlightenment 
philosophers such as Hobbes,54 Locke,55 Montesquieu,56 and 

Mexico admits, in obedience to her own laws, that she is indeed under obligation to 
indemnify in an adequate manner, but the doctrine which she maintains on the 
subject, which is based on the most authoritative opinions of writers of treatises on 
international law, is that the time and manner of such payment must be determined by 
her own laws.” (alteration in original)). 
50. A good expression of the Calvo Doctrine, named after its Argentine 
proponent, Carlos Calvo, is contained in the following passage: 
It is certain that aliens who establish themselves in a country have the same 
right to protection as nationals, but they ought not to lay claim to a 
protection more extended. If they suffer any wrong, they ought to count on 
the government of the country prosecuting the delinquents, and not claim 
from the state to which the authors of the violence belong any pecuniary 
indemnity . . . . The rule that in more than one case it has been attempted to 
impose on American states is that foreigners merit regard and privilege more 
marked and extended than those accorded even to the nationals of the 
country where they reside. The principle is intrinsically contrary to the law of 
equality of nations. 
DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE 17–19 (1955), quoted in LOWENFELD, supra note 5, 
at 473 n.13. 
51. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
52. Id. at 428.  
53. This era covers roughly the time period between 1890 and 1937. The most 
important cases during this era include: Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
(striking down a New York law prohibiting bakery work for more than sixty hours a 
week on grounds that it violates the rights of the contracting parties to freely enter into 
any type of contract regardless of the possible harm to the workers); Smyth v. Ames, 
169 U.S. 466 (1898) (striking down a Nebraska law relating to a minimum railway fare); 
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that a manufacturing 
monopoly of ninety-eight percent of the country’s sugar refining may not be 
prohibited). 
54. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). His major work is typically considered to be 
Leviathan (1651). 
55. John Locke (1632-1704). His major work included Two Treatises of Government 
(1690), which was instrumental in the drafting of the US Declaration of Independence. 
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Rousseau,57 this notion emphasizes the inviolability of the right 
to property. On the opposite side of this spectrum lies the 
Marxist conception of property, which directly links the 
ownership of means of production to the “exploitation of man 
by man.”58  
Some variations of the latter conception seem to have had 
more acceptance in the traditional Chinese as well as African 
societies. Confucian emphasis on social obligations rather than 
individual rights, for example, and the pursuit of communal 
harmony is believed to have had an enduring influence on 
Chinese society down through the ages.59 The customary African 
notions of property are similar. A Nigerian Chief once aptly 
described it as follows: “I conceive that land belongs to a vast 
family of which many are dead, few are living, and countless 
members are unborn.”60 Judge Elias notes that these 
conceptions are common to many African societies.61  
Although it is difficult to directly link traditional notions of 
property to developments that occurred in the post-colonial era 
in China and Africa, it is not surprising that the Marxist 
conception of property made more sense to the Chinese and 
African societies. Indeed, in the post-colonial period, no 
political ideology has had a more profound influence in the 
Chinese62 and African societies.63 As China, still officially a 

56. Charles Montesquieu (1689–1755). His major work was The Spirit of Law 
(1748). 
57. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). His major work was The Social Contract 
(1762). 
58. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 24 (D. 
Ryazanoff ed., Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans., Atheneum Publishers 1963) (1848). 
59. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 36–38. Recent modifications are sometimes 
called “Neo-Confucianism.” See, e.g., MACCORMACK, supra note 24, at 3. The basic 
conceptions seem to have endured. 
60. ELIAS, supra note 30, at 162 (quoting a statement made by a Nigerian chief to 
the West African Lands Committee in 1912). 
61. Id. at 162 & n.1. 
62. See Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investment in China: Chimera of Protection 
and Predictability?, 34 VA. J. IN’T’L. L. 615, 625 (1994) (“After the Communist regime 
took control of the government in 1949, it began a nationalization and expropriation 
process. While political circumstances are very different today, the fact that some of the 
current Chinese leaders were part of the early party power structure suggests that these 
events may be of more than mere historical interest. In 1936, there were over $3.48 
billion in foreign investments in China. Japan and Great Britain led in total 
investments, followed at some distance by the United States and France. After the 
Communist revolution, China began a ‘“slow motion nationalization’” program 
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communist state,64 pursues a state-led, socio-capitalist economy, 
which started with its opening-up policy in 1978,65 and many 
post-colonial Africa states attempt to do the same,66 their 
respective existing economic systems are as complicated as their 
respective societies and defy easy classification. In addition to 
the ideological underpinnings, practical considerations also 
dictate the contents of investment treaties that China is entering 
into with its Western as well as African partners. But, how do 
these long-standing notions of ownership of private property 
and the novelty of the new South-South economic partnership 
get expression in the investment treaties? It is a difficult 
question because ordinarily investment treaties are negotiated in 
North-South economic partnerships, which almost invariably 
represent competing notions of the function of private 
ownership of property and the extent of its protection from 
government intervention. Regardless of their success rate, 
Southern partners, who are almost invariably the recipients of 
the investment, have traditionally focused on their right to 
regulate while the Northern partners aggressively negotiated 
BITs that provided the maximum possible protection to their 
investment. China and Africa share similar philosophical 
viewpoints, not only regarding the function of property, but also 
concerning negotiated investment treaties with their wealthier 

resulting in the virtual termination of all direct foreign investment by 1957.” (citations 
omitted)). 
63. Beverly I. Moran, Homogenized Law: Can the United States Learn from African 
Mistakes?, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 361, 367 (2001) (citing MICHAEL HODD, THE 
ECONOMIES OF AFRICA 34–35 (1991)). 
64. See, e.g., CONST. COMMUNIST PARTY general program (2012) (China), available 
at http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_
27138030.htm (“The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents and the 
Scientific Outlook on Development as its guide to action.”). 
65. That year, the new leaders of China adopted a policy called a “socialist system 
with Chinese characteristics.” At the time, the new leader, Deng Xiaoping, said: “It 
does not matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.” GALLAGHER 
& SHAN, supra note 6, at 5 (citing China’s Communist Revolution, BBC NEWS, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/china_50/deng.htm 
(last visited May 1, 2014)). 
66. Moran, supra note 63, at 367. For a comprehensive discussion of the nature 
and current state of the African economy and its pitfalls, see CHARLES ROXBURGH ET 
AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., LIONS ON THE MOVE: THE PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL OF 
AFRICAN ECONOMIES (June 2010), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/
africa/lions_on_the_move. 
1052 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1035 
Northern partners from the standpoint of maintaining the 
broadest possible regulatory authority for decades. A related 
question looks at the extent that China and Africa have taken 
these factors into account in their direct BIT negotiations. In 
exploring the answers to these questions, Part II.A.2 below looks 
at the evolution of Chinese investment treaties, which sheds 
some light on the evolution of the Chinese economy itself and 
its role in the world economic order. 
2. Generational Development of Chinese BITs 
Professors Gallagher & Shan divide recent Chinese foreign 
investment history into four periods.67 The first period extends 
from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949 to the adoption of China’s open-door policy in 1978. 
During this period, although the extent of it is disputed, China 
conducted the nationalization of private property and expelled 
foreign investors through what is sometimes called “retaliatory 
requisition.”68 
During the second period, which followed its opening-up 
policy and lasted until 1991, China adopted remarkable policy 
changes to attract foreign investment and enacted many 
investment-friendly laws.69 It also entered into many IIAs, most 
notably thirty BITs, the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) Convention,70 and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) 
Convention.71 Most of the BITs signed during this period were 
with European countries. During the same time, China signed 
an investment insurance agreement with the United States, but 

67. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 4. 
68. Id. at 4–5. 
69. Id. at 6. For a more detailed discussion of Chinese Investment laws, see 
generally Wenhua Shan, The Legal Framework of China-EU Investment Relations – A Critical 
Appraisal, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L 507, 507–09 (2006). 
70. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 6. 
71. Id. China was a member of Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(“MIGA”) Convention since its entry into force in 1988. Although MIGA is not a typical 
investment treaty, it provides insurance against political risk. See MULTILATERAL INV. 
GUARANTEE AGENCY, http://www.miga.org/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
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never a BIT.72 Interestingly, China did sign a BIT with one 
African country during this period, namely Ghana.73  
During the third period, which spanned from 1992 to 2000, 
China saw an exponential growth in foreign investment. Indeed, 
FDI rose tenfold, from US$4.3 billion in 1991 to US$45.2 billion 
in 1997.74 During this period, China signed sixty-six BITs and 
modified the substantive and procedural contents of the 
previous generation of BITs. For example, it began adopting the 
principle of national treatment, to some degree.75 During this 
time China signed BITs with fourteen African countries: Egypt, 
Morocco, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Algeria, Gabon, 
Cameroon, Nigeria,76 Sudan, Congo (Dem. Rep.), South Africa, 
Cape Verde, and Ethiopia.77 
The fourth and latest period, which continues to this day, 
began in 2001—the year of China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”).78 This was a period that saw 
consistently high levels of economic growth and 
transformation.79 By the end of 2009, China was the number one 
recipient of FDI for thirteen years in a row.80 It was also during 
this period that China consolidated what it calls its “Going 
Abroad” policy.81 The predicate for this policy was the State 
Council’s July 2004 adoption of regulations simplifying Outward 
Direct Investment (“ODI”) approval procedures.82 China also 
set up a new sovereign wealth fund—the China Investment 
Corporation (“CIC”)—with a start-up capital of US$200 billion 

72. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 6 n.21. For a discussion of the history and 
prospect of a China-US BIT, see Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future 
of Investment Treat Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J. 
ECON. L. 457, 457 (2009) (suggesting that Chinese approach to investment treaty has 
been “Americanized”). 
73. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, app. 1 at 419 (Africa). 
74. Id. at 7. 
75. Id. app. 1 at 419 (Africa). 
76. Id. Note that the China-Nigeria BIT that was signed in 1997 was abolished and 
was resigned in 2001. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 8–9. 
79. Id. at 8. In numerical terms, Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) in China rose 
at the rate of eighteen percent annually, reaching US$92.4 billion in 2008. 
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 2. 
80. Id. 
81. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 12. 
82. Id. at 12. 
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to invest some of the large reserves that it had accumulated over 
the years.83 By the end of 2009, that capital increased to US$2.4 
trillion.84 
Currently, China is not only the largest recipient of foreign 
investment, but also one of the largest investors of capital in 
foreign countries.85 China has signed about forty-three more 
BITs since it acceded to the WTO in 2001, and has initiated a 
process to renegotiate the BITs that it has signed previously—
understandably to account for its transformation from a 
recipient of FDI to an exporter of ODI.86 Out of the forty-three 
BITs signed in the post-WTO accession period, at least sixteen 
were with African countries: Congo, Botswana, Sierra Leone, 
Mozambique, Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Benin, Uganda, 
Tunisia, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Madagascar, Guinea, and 
Seychelles.87 China’s total number of BITs, as of this writing, are 
about 130, among which thirty-two are with African states.88 
Each one of the three generations of BITs has its own 
fundamental characteristics. One of each model signed with 
African states is selected for detailed analysis below. Before the 
detailed discussion is provided, it is important to briefly identify 
the salient features of each generation. The first generation of 
Chinese BITs were signed in the 1980s; the first of these BITs 
was with Sweden, and indeed most were with developed states of 
the West.89 These BITs are often characterized as conservative. 
While they accorded Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) treatment 
to foreign investors, they did not extend national treatment.90 

83. See Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat: China 
39, WT/TPR/S/199 (Apr. 16, 2008). 
84. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 6, at 2 n.4 (citing MOFCOM, http://
www.mofcom.gov.cn). 
85. Comprehensive data is available at UNCTAD, COUNTRY FACT SHEET: CHINA 
(2011), available at http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/wir11_fs_cn_en.pdf. 
86. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
87. Id. app. 1 at 420. 
88. Full List of Bilateral Investment Agreements (China), UNCTAD (June 2013), 
http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_china.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 
2013). 
89. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 35. Including Germany, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Finland and Norway. Id. It was also during the same period that the 
failed China-United States BIT negotiations were commenced. Id. Among the 
developing countries that signed BITs with China during this time were Ghana and 
Thailand. Id. 
90. Id. at 37. 
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Whereas they promised compensation for expropriation, the 
determination of the legality of the expropriation was left for 
local courts while the possibility of the determination of the 
quantum of compensation by ad hoc international arbitration 
was recognized.91 As a result of China’s accession to the ICSID 
Convention, the most important feature of the second 
generation BITs, adopted between 1990 and 1997, was the 
reference to ICSID arbitration.92 Investor access to ICSID 
arbitration was, however, limited to the quantum of 
compensation for expropriation.93 The last and current model, 
adopted in 1998, made both substantive and procedural 
changes. Substantively, among other things, it added national 
treatment and procedurally it accorded investors unqualified 
access to international arbitration, including ICSID arbitration.94  
B. China-Africa Investment Regime—A Closer Look at BITs 
As indicated above, China currently has thirty-two BITs with 
African states. Sixteen of them have already come into effect.95 
Again, they encompass three generations of Chinese BITs: the 
first generation signed from 1982 to 1989 (period of launching 
of the BIT program); the second generation from 1990 to 1997 
(China’s accession to ICSID); and the third generation from 
1998 to the present.96 
One of each is selected for analysis. China’s earliest Africa 
BIT was with Ghana, which was signed on October 12, 1989, and 
came into effect on November 22, 1991. The latest to come into 
effect was China’s BIT with Madagascar, which was signed on 
November 21, 2005, and came into effect on July 1, 2007. 

91. Id. 
92. Id. It is important to note that not all BITs signed during this time referenced 
to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). Id. 
93. Id. at 38. This was accomplished through the submission of reservations to the 
ICSID Convention on the class of disputes that China agreed to submit to ICSID 
arbitration. See id. at 38 n.182. 
94. Id. at 39–40. 
95. Full List of Bilateral Investment Agreements (China), supra note 88. The UNCTAD 
database shows only twelve as having come into effect but the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Commerce lists sixteen. See MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn. 
96. GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 6, at 35. For a detailed discussion, see Stephan 
W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation of Investment Treaties of the 
People’s Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73 (2007). 
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Finally, the China-Ethiopia BIT has been selected, which was 
signed on 11 May 1998, and came into effect on May 1, 2000.97 
These three BITs represent the three generations of Chinese 
BITs. This section takes a closer look at the important 
substantive and dispute settlement provisions of each and puts 
the existing China-Africa investment regime in perspective. 
1. Scope and Admission 
The first two generations of BITs represented by China-
Ghana and China-Ethiopia BITs define “investment” and 
“investor” in almost identical language while the third 
generation, represented by China-Madagascar, expands the 
definition in some respects. The definition contained in the 
China-Ethiopia BIT, which is very similar to that in the China-
Ghana BIT, includes:  
(a) movable, immovable property and other property rights 
such as mortgages and pledges; (b) shares, stock and any 
other kind of participation in company, (c) claims to money 
or to any other performance having an economic value; (d) 
copyright, industrial property, know-how and technological 
process; e) concessions conferred by law including 
concessions to search for or exploit natural resources.98 
 The China-Madagascar BIT replaced copyright, industrial 
property, know-how and technological process” with 
“intellectual property, commercial property and industrial 
property.”99 It also expanded the concessions provision by 
adding “by contract” to “by law.”100 A look at China’s BIT with 
Sweden, signed during the first period, suggests that the 

97. The texts of China-Ghana, China-Ethiopia, China-Madagascar are available on 
the UNCTAD website. Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, China-Ghana, Oct. 12, 1989 [hereinafter China-Ghana BIT], available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_ghana.pdf; Agreement on the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Eth., May 11, 1998 
[hereinafter China-Ethiopia BIT], available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/
docs/bits/china_ethiopia.pdf; Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, China-Madag., Nov. 21, 2005 [hereinafter China-Madagascar 
BIT], available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/madagascar_china_
fr.pdf. 
98. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 1; China-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 97, art. 
1. 
99. China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 1. 
100. Id. 
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concessions provision is stated a little differently. It reads: “such 
business-concessions as under public law or under contract, 
including concessions regarding the prospecting for, or the 
extraction or winning of natural resources, as given to their 
holder a legal position of some duration.”101 The use of the less 
elaborate concession language in the China-Africa BITs is 
surprising given China’s interest in the exploration of natural 
resources in Africa. 
The promotion and admission of investment provisions of 
all three BITs is almost identical. The Ethiopian BIT reads in 
pertinent part: “Each Contracting Party shall encourage 
investors of the other Contracting Party to make investment in 
its territory and admit such investment in accordance with its 
laws and regulations.”102 While the admission provisions of the 
China-Ghana and China-Ethiopia BITs contain a provision on 
the facilitation of the issuance of visas and work permits to 
investors in the contracting states, the China-Madagascar BIT, 
which is the latest, omits that provision.103 Notably, the China-
Sweden BIT does not contain an admission provision. It is 
exclusively focused on the treatment of investment that had 
already been admitted.104 
All three generations of Chinese BITs with the African 
states subject the admission of foreign investment exclusively to 
domestic laws.105 Presumably, the substantive non-discrimination 
provisions equalize the opportunities to all foreign investors 

101. Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
art. 1, China-Swed., Mar. 29, 1982 [hereinafter China-Sweden BIT], available at http://
unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_sweden.pdf. 
102. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 2; China-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 97, 
art. 2; China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 2. 
103. See China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97. 
104. China-Sweden BIT, supra note 101, arts. 1–2. 
105. Investment treaties usually employ one of three pre-establishment 
approaches: a top-down approach; a bottom-up approach; and a middle-ground 
approach. The top-down approach applies the non-discrimination provisions to all 
sectors of the economy except for those expressly excluded. The bottom-up approach 
is the reverse of that, i.e., it applies the non-discriminatory provisions to specifically 
identified sectors. The middle-ground approach applies the bottom-up principle to 
pre-establishment and the top-down principle to post-establishment. These approaches 
are discussed more fully in Stefan D. Amarasinha & Juliane Kokott, Multilateral 
Investment Rules Revisited, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 119, 143–44 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds, 2008). 
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barring special preferential treatments tolerated under these 
treaties. 
2. Treatment 
The provisions designed to provide the rules for the 
treatment of admitted investment are differently formulated. 
The earliest provision, which is contained in the China-Ghana 
BIT, is entitled “Protection of Investments and Most Favored 
State Treatment.” It reads under that title: 
1. Investments and activities associated with investments 
of investors of either Contracting State shall be accorded 
equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection in the 
territory of the other Contracting State. 
2. The treatment and protection referred to in 
Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be less favorable than 
that accorded to investments and activities associated with 
such investments of investors of a third State. 
3. The treatment and protection mentioned in the 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not include any 
preferential treatment accorded by the other Contracting 
State to investments of investors of a third State based on 
customs union, free trade zone, economic union, 
agreement relating to avoidance of double taxation or for 
facilitating frontier trade.106 
The second generation, which is the China-Ethiopia BIT, 
modifies this in only one way: It adds “fair” to “equitable” in the 
first paragraph to read “fair and equitable treatment.” Given the 
level of investment disputes involving MFN, particularly the 
principle of fair and equitable treatment over the years, the 
omission of “fair” cannot be completely without legal 
significance. 
The most recent BIT—China-Madagascar—modifies the 
treatment provision in many respects. Not only does it add 
national treatment in express language,107 it also elaborates the 

106. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 3. 
107. See China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 4(1) (“Without prejudice to its 
laws and regulations, each Contracting State shall accord to investments, and activities 
of investments of investors of the other Contracting Party treatment not less favorable 
than that accorded to the investment of its own investors or to investors of any third 
State, if the treatment is more favorable.”). 
2014] CHINA-AFRICA INVESTMENT TREATIES 1059 
fair and equitable and MFN provisions in more ways than one. 
First, it identifies the standard by which the fair and equitable 
principle is judged, namely, “in accordance with the principles 
of international law.”108 It also adds that such fair and equitable 
treatment “shall not be impeded in laws or in fact.”109 Because it 
is difficult to ascertain the exact meaning of the last part, the 
parties have added guidance. The next provision reads:  
Legal or de facto obstacles to the fair and equitable 
treatment mainly mean, but not limited to: non-equitable 
treatment of all kinds of restrictions on the means of 
production and management, non-equitable treatment of 
all kinds of restrictions on sale of products at home and 
broad, as well as other measures with similar effect. But 
measures for reasons of security, public order, health, 
ethical and environmental protection and other reasons, 
these measures shall not be regarded as obstacles.110  
This provision is unusually detailed for a fair and equitable 
treatment provision because it attempts, perhaps unsuccessfully, 
to identify measures that are and are not considered denial of 
fair and equitable treatment.111 It is clear that it is a specially 

108. Id. art. 3(1). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. art. 3(3). 
111. One of the most recent of the Chinese BITs on the UNCTAD Database 
(2006) is the one with Latvia. That BIT contains standard language of Fair and 
equitable, Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) and National Treatment. It is reproduced 
below for ease of reference: 
Article 3 TREATMENT OF INVESTMENT 
1. Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall all the time be 
accorded fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party. 
2. Without prejudice to its laws and regulations, each Contracting party 
shall accord to investments and activities with such investments by the 
investors of the other Contraction Party treatment not less favorable than that 
accorded to the investments and associated activities by its own investors. 
3. Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments and activities 
associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting 
Party to treatment less favorable than that accorded to the investments and 
associated activities by the investors of any third State. 
4. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments and activities 
associated with such investments by the investors of the other Contracting 
Party treatment, which is the most favorable of those stipulated in paragraph 
2 and paragraph 3 of this Article. 
5. The provisions of Paragraphs 3 of this Article shall not be construed so 
as to oblige one Contracting Party to extend to the investors of the other 
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negotiated provision because of specific concerns. Nonetheless, 
it does not fundamentally change the character of this BIT as an 
integral part of Chinese third generation BITs. 
3. Expropriation 
The expropriation provisions of all three BITs are 
formulated differently, although the substance is more or less 
the same. The China-Ghana BIT is formulated in permissive 
language: “Either Contracting Party may, for the national 
security and public interest, expropriate, nationalize or take 
similar measures . . . .”112 The limitations are “(a) under 
domestic legal procedure; (b) without discrimination; (c) 
payment of compensation.” The compensation, which must be 
“paid without delay,” has to be equivalent to the value of the 
property at the taking.113 Further, if the investor contests the 
legality of the expropriation under the laws of the taking state, it 
may request a review by the authorities of that state.114 Moreover, 
if the loss occurs as a result of emergent circumstances such as 
war or other types of unrest, the investor would be treated no 
less favorably than “a third state.”115 Although this is not a 
complete rejection of the Hull Rule, it is certainly less protective. 
While it appears to be indicative of the then existing Chinese 
view on the right to property and the extent of tolerance for 
government intervention as well as its position as the recipient 
of foreign direct investment from the West, a look at some of the 
BITs that it signed with Western counties almost contradicts this 

Contracting Party the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege by 
virtue of: 
(a) any customs union, free trade zone, economic union, monetary union 
and any international agreement resulting in such unions, or similar 
institutions; 
(b) any international agreement or arrangement relating wholly or mainly 
to taxation; 
(c) any arrangements for facilitating small scale frontier trade in border 
areas. 
Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
China-Latvia, Apr. 15, 2004 [hereinafter China-Latvia BIT], available at http://
unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/China_Latvia.pdf. 
112. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 4(1). 
113. Id. art. 4(1)–(2). 
114. Id. art. 4(3). 
115. Id. art. 4(4). 
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conclusion. For example, the China-Sweden BIT contains 
language more protective of investment than the China-Ghana 
BIT. The relevant potion of the China-Sweden BIT reads: 
Neither Contracting State shall expropriate or nationalize, 
or take any similar measure in regard to investment made in 
its territory by an investor of the other Contracting State, 
except in the public interest, under due process of law and 
against compensation, the purpose of which shall be to 
place the investor in the same financial position as the 
investor would have been in had the expropriation or 
nationalization not taken place.116 
This rule, apparently the codification of the Chorzow 
Factory rule,117 which is sometimes said to be a rule of customary 
international law, is supplemented by a subsection, which 
accounts for lost current income and proceeds of liquidated 
assets.118 This is one of many indications that not only did China 
not strictly use a particular model in each corresponding era, 
but also that its BITs do not support the conclusion that it 
systematically pursued its North-South and South-South 
negotiations with discernible avaricious objectives. In the above 
example, at that time, it would have made perfect sense for 
China to use the China-Sweden expropriation language, which 
is arguably more protective of investment, in its BIT with Ghana. 
It is difficult to think that it was a function of Ghana’s 
negotiating position at that time. The argument that China 
probably did not have a systematic, coherent, and purely self-
interested BIT program similar to the United States will be 
developed further. 
The China-Ethiopia BIT expropriation provision changes 
the “Either Contracting Party may expropriate” language of the 
China-Ghana BIT to  
Neither Contracting Party shall expropriate, nationalize or 
take similar measures (hereinafter referred to as 
(‘expropriate’) against investment of the investors of the 
other Contracting Party in its territory, unless the following 
conditions are met: (a) for the public interest; b) under 

116. China-Sweden BIT, supra note 101, art. 3(1). 
117. Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13) 
(requiring full restitution). 
118. China-Sweden BIT, supra note 101, art. 3(2). 
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domestic legal procedure; (c) without discrimination; (d) 
against compensation.119  
The compensation, which must be paid without delay, would be 
equal to the value of the investment at the time of the 
expropriation.120 This BIT omits the war or conflict 
compensation provision altogether. 
The China-Madagascar BIT changed the language in many 
different ways. Most notably, it does not even begin with 
expropriation or nationalization. It begins with a general 
investment protection statement: “Investments made by 
investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party shall enjoy the full and comprehensive 
protection and security.”121 It then uses the more common 
“Neither—shall” language but elaborates the exceptions: “(a) 
adopting measures for public interests under good legal 
framework; (b) without discrimination and not contrary to the 
commitments of the Contracting Parties; (c) against fair 
compensation when adopting the measures.”122 In terms of the 
determination of fair compensation, it adds that it has to be 
equivalent to the value of the expropriated investment 
“immediately before [its taking] became public knowledge.”123 
It further requires the payment of interest, which shall accrue 
from taking to actual payment.124 This appears to be China’s 
latest formulation of the expropriation provision. The language 
is more or less consistent with other Chinese BITs signed during 
this period.125 

119. China-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 97, art. 4(1). 
120. Id. art. 4(2). 
121. China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 5(1). 
122. Id. art. 5(2). 
123. Id. art. 5(3). 
124. Id. 
125. See, e.g., China-Latvia BIT, supra note 111, art. 4. Article 4 reads: 
1. Neither Contacting Party shall expropriate, nationalize or take other 
similar measures (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) against the 
investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party in its territory, 
unless all the following conditions are met: 
(a) for the public interests; 
(b) under domestic legal procedure; 
(c) without discrimination; 
(d) against compensation 
2. The compensation mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 
equivalent to the value of the expropriated investments immediately before 
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4. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
The investor-state dispute settlement provisions of the 
earliest BIT, namely China-Ghana, do not contain a special rule 
on the settlement of disputes other than the quantum of 
compensation.126 Presumably, any dispute other than the 
quantum of compensation would be settled through the 
domestic legal process of the respective state. The quantum may 
be submitted to arbitration. Although it could be ad hoc, the 
default rule grants the chairman of the Arbitration Institute of 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce appointment 
authority,127 presumably because of Sweden’s perceived political 
neutrality at the time. Once constituted, the tribunal is given the 
option to use the rules of procedure of the Stockholm center or 
ICSID.128 It is interesting to note that ICSID is mentioned even 
in the earliest of Chinese BITs, albeit limited to the potential use 
of its procedural rules. 
The China-Ethiopia BIT elaborated the investor-state 
dispute settlement mechanism in at least six ways. First, it 
explicitly stated that either party may submit a claim to the 
domestic court of the state receiving the investment. Second, it 
opened the option for either party to submit disputes relating to 
the quantum of compensation to either an ad hoc or ICSID 
arbitration once both have become members of ICSID. Third, it 
shifted the appointment authority from the chair of the 
Stockholm Arbitration Institute to the Secretary General of 
ICSID. Fourth, it limited the options that the arbitrators have in 
selecting the rules of procedure to ICSID—although it did not 
completely take away the arbitrators’ discretion in selecting 
other rules. Fifth, it included a choice of law provision. The 
chosen laws include the domestic laws of the host state 
(including its conflict of laws), the BIT itself, and “recognized 

the expropriation is taken or the impending expropriation becomes public 
knowledge, whichever is earlier. The value shall be determined in accordance 
with generally recognized principles of valuation. The compensation shall be 
in a freely convertible currency. The compensation shall include interest at a 
normal commercial rate from the date of expropriation until the date of 
payment. The compensation shall also be made without delay, be effectively 
realizable and freely transferable. 
126. China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 10(1). 
127. Id. art. 10(2). 
128. Id. art 10(3). 
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principles of international law accepted by both Contracting 
Parties.” Finally, it added a provision on the allocation of cost, 
specifically providing that the parties bear the cost in equal 
proportion.129 
The China-Madagascar BIT, while preserving the ICSID 
option, limited the choice to the investor by replacing the 
“either party” with the “at the request of the investor 
concerned” subject to the exhaustion of local administrative 
remedies.130 It also expressly provided that the awards shall be 
enforced under the ICSID Convention i.e., as if it were the 
domestic court judgment of the Contracting State.131 It further 
provided that “[d]uring the arbitration process or enforcement 
of arbitral awards, the Contracting Party related to the dispute 
shall not hold that the investor has received partial or total 
insurance compensation as defense.”132 
From the above discussion, it seems clear that the latest 
one—China-Madagascar—contains the hallmarks of a North-
South BIT, with greater protection given to the investor, which 
is almost exclusively Chinese; however, as the above discussion 
shows, it cannot be concluded that China-Africa BITs, as might 
be expected, are systematically or progressively acquiring a 
North-South character. If anything, unlike the United States, the 
analysis suggests that China has not pursued a strict and 
intentional model-based BIT negotiations which reflects its 
growing negotiating power. It is not clear whether this is because 
of benevolence, cultural preference, tactical approach, or sheer 
incoherence. There is almost no doubt, however, that the one 
way flow of investment and China’s ever growing influence and 
negotiating power would present temptations and challenges 
that could affect the durability of the investment relations. The 
remedy for such challenges would be duly negotiated 
investment treaties, which uniformly contain minimum 
standards that protect the environment and good order of the 

129. China-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 97, art. 9(1)–(8). It is important to note that 
China almost never uses “customary international law” in its treaties, instead adopting 
the “principles of international law accepted by both parties.” See Congyan, supra note 
72, at 461. 
130. China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 10(2). 
131. See id. art. 10(3). 
132. Id. art. 10(4). 
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host community while providing an attractive and conducive 
business atmosphere. The following Part identifies and discusses 
some contemporary and useful normative prescriptions that 
must guide the revitalization of China-Africa investment treaties. 
III. MODELING THE CHINA-AFRICA INVESTMENT REGIME 
 Despite serious allegations of incoherence in the 
jurisprudence of international investment law133 and the debate 
about whether it is purely lex specialis,134 a system, a 
framework135 or a regime,136 it is clearly inherently North-South 
in its origin, formulation, and sustenance. In answering the 
frequently asked question of why a trade like multilateral 
arrangement eluded international investment, Professor 
Salacuse once said that there is a technical and political answer 
to the question. The technical one is simple: multilateral 
negotiations are difficult to bring to conclusion.137 The political 
answer is more interesting: “[g]iven the asymmetric nature of 
bilateral negotiations between a strong, developed country and a 
usually much weaker developing country, the bilateral setting 
allows the developed country to use its power more effectively 
than does a multilateral setting, where the power may be much 
diluted.”138 Further noting that these divided negotiations would 
deprive the developing countries of the opportunity to negotiate 
in blocks, he adds a more interesting observation:  

133. See, e.g., JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 
(2005); Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the 
Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471 (2009); Susan D. 
Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005); 
Jacques Werner, Making Investment Arbitration More Certain: A Modest Proposal, 4 J. 
WORLD INV. 767 (2003) (all discussing the problem of coherence). 
134. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 267 (2d 
ed. 2004). 
135. David D. Caron, Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on 
Legitimacy, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 513, 516 (2009) (arguing that it is a mistake 
to consider it a system; it is a framework and as such the expectation of jurisprudential 
coherence might be misguided). 
136. See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 
HARV. INT’L . L.J. 427, 467 (2010) (arguing that it is a regime). 
137. Id. at 464. 
138. Id. 
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[w]hereas developed countries would be willing to enter 
into bilateral treaties with developing countries for 
investment liberalization, knowing full well that few if any 
enterprises from the developing country would ever invest 
in the developed state, they have been unwilling to enter 
into treaties that would grant such liberalization to investors 
from other developed states, who could become strong 
competitors to the host countries’ own enterprises.139 
Although South-South BITs have mushroomed in recent 
years,140 their doctrinal foundations are by no means organic to 
those relations. Hence the adaptation is not without serious 
difficulty. This problem is particularly acute in the China-Africa 
context because of China’s ambiguous position as theoretically 
South with all the hallmarks of the North in its stature and 
pursuit.141 Hence, for the ambitious investment relations to 
endure, grow, and bear more fruit, the substantive contents and 
the structure of dispute settlement need to be revisited in light 
of their own cultural backgrounds and contemporary 
developments. This Part identifies some of the most important 
contemporary notions that must inform normative and 
structural developments in China-Africa investment relations. 
A. Contemporary Models in International Investment Law and Their 
Impact on China-Africa Investment 
Following many years of consultations, the US Department 
of State and US Trade Representative (“USTR”) jointly released 
the revised 2012 BIT Model on April 20, 2012. The press release 
noted that the “Administration made several important changes 
to the BIT text [2004 Model] so as to enhance transparency and 
public participation; sharpen the disciplines that address 
preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises, including the 
distortions created by certain indigenous innovation policies; 
and strengthen protections relating to labor and the 

139. Id. at 465. 
140. Currently, many of the about 3000 BITs are South-South. Cf. Country-Specific 
Lists of Bilateral Investment Treaties, UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/
International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/Country-specific-Lists-of-
BITs.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
141. For example, it is suggested that Chinese investment approach is being 
“Americanized.” Congyan, supra note 72, at 459. 
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environment.”142 The new Model addresses cutting-edge issues 
in ways that are acceptable to the United States. Another notable 
model is the IISD Model, which focuses on sustainable 
development and addresses some of the same cutting-edge 
topics. They both attempt to establish a balance that they deem 
appropriate between investment protection and the host 
government’s ability to regulate in the public interest. This Part 
examines these models to identify some of the important issues 
that China and Africa need to address as they recalibrate their 
existing investment regime. The discussion focuses on issues 
that are either ignored or inadequately addressed in the exiting 
China-Africa treaties including, labor and environment, 
corruption and transparency, corporate social responsibility, 
and dispute settlement. 
1. Labor and Environment 
The regulation of labor and the protection of the 
environment are two of the most serious contemporary 
challenges of the international investment regime. All three 
generations of Chinese BITs make no reference to labor and 
environment. These issues are increasingly becoming important 
in China-Africa investment relations. 
a. Labor 
Consider this typical scenario: For decades, the Zambian 
Copperbelt towns looked like “a shell of [their] lucrative past”143 
with “tennis courts and cricket fields once provided and 
maintained by Zambian parastatals now overgrown with 
weeds.”144 In 1998, the China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining 
Corporation (“CNMC”) purchased one of the mines, invested 
US$130 million and revitalized it. In 2003, it opened three more 
mines and hired more than 6000 Zambian workers with plans to 

142. Media Note, Off. of Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States 
Concludes Review of Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (April 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188198.htm. 
143. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “YOU’LL BE FIRED IF YOU REFUSE”: LABOR ABUSES IN 
ZAMBIA’S CHINESE STATE-OWNED COPPER MINES 3 (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/zambia1111ForWebUpload.pdf. 
144. Id. 
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hire several thousands more in subsequent years.145 According to 
a comprehensive Human Rights Watch Report, after the 
Chinese company took over, “[m]ine shafts have been upgraded 
with modern equipment, the smelter is deemed state-of-the art, 
and computers have replaced pencils in planning.”146 The 
Zambian workers there “expressed gratitude to the Chinese 
investors for their jobs and the enormous investment being 
made.”147 
 That is not the whole story, however. The Zambian workers 
who expressed gratitude also added that “Chinese copper 
operations were the country’s worst when it comes to health and 
safety.”148 The Human Rights Watch Report accuses the Chinese 
company of gross violations of national and international labor 
standards including low wages, long working hours without 
appropriate overtime pay or other forms of benefits.149 It states 
in particular that “[a]t its most extreme, a 2005 explosion at a 
Chinese-owned explosives manufacturing plant in Chambishi 
killed 46 Zambian workers; the following year, riots in 
Chambishi over work conditions culminated in the shooting of 
at least five miners, allegedly by a Chinese manager.”150 
Significantly, the Report also notes that such labor practices are 
“strikingly similar to safety and labor problems that plague 
China’s domestic mining industry.”151 Although the Report takes 
an exclusively human rights perspective and its motives and 
some of its conclusions might be disputed, it is clear that some 
labor and employment problems exist. In fact, this might be 
taken as an example of what might be happening in other parts 
of Africa where Chinese companies invest. Interestingly, not 
even the Human Rights Watch Report accuses China of treating 
African workers worse than its own citizens who work in the 
same industries. This is an interesting fact because it suggests 
that whatever labor problems there are, it is probably because of 
factors other than discriminatory intent or purpose which makes 
the solution that much easier. Although there might be 

145. See id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. See id. at 4. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 2. 
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unexplored domestic legal remedies, they are often insufficient 
and labor provisions in BITs could play a significant role in 
addressing this problem. 
As indicated above, none of the Chinese BITs address labor 
issues. Labor issues are sensitive anywhere, and unfortunately, 
labor standards have not yet found meaningful express in 
existing investment treaties anywhere. Some most contemporary 
expressions are contained in US 2012 BIT Model and the IISD 
Model.152 

152. US 2012 Model BIT, supra note 10, art. 13. Article 13 reads: 
Article 13: Investment and Labor 
1. The Parties reaffirm their respective obligations as members of the 
International Labor Organization (“ILO”) and their commitments under the 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its 
Follow-Up. 
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by 
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws. 
Accordingly, each Party shall ensure that it does not waive or otherwise 
derogate from or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from its labor laws 
where the waiver or derogation would be inconsistent with the labor rights 
referred to in subparagraphs (a) through (e) of paragraph 3, or fail to 
effectively enforce its labor laws through a sustained or recurring course of 
action or inaction, as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, or retention of an investment in its territory. 
3. For purposes of this Article, “labor laws” means each Party’s statutes or 
regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to the following: 
(a) freedom of association; 
(b) the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
(c) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; 
(d) the effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the worst 
forms of child labor; 
(e) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation; and 
(f) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 
work,and occupational safety and health. 
4. A Party may make a written request for consultations with the other Party 
regarding any matter arising under this Article. The other Party shall respond 
to a request for consultations within thirty days of receipt of such request. 
Thereafter, the Parties shall consult and endeavor to reach a mutually 
satisfactory resolution. 
5. The Parties confirm that each Party may, as appropriate, provide 
opportunities for public participation regarding any matter arising under this 
Article. 
Id. 
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Although the 2012 Model made significant progress to the 
2004 Model by adding paragraphs 1, 4 and 5,153 critics note that 
it does not go far enough. The dilemma is obvious: while on the 
one hand, states desire to encourage foreign investment, on the 
other hand, they want to provide appropriate protection to their 
workforce. The dilemma is greater for states who are both 
recipients and exporters of capital like the United States and 
China. Within the United States, such balance is a serious 
political issue. The 2012 Model, released by a democratic 
administration, is considered relatively pro labor as compared to 
the prior one released under a republican leadership. Be that as 
it may, this is an acceptable expression of labor standards. Even 
the IISD Model is limited to directly incorporating the 
International Labour Organization (“ILO”) standards by 
reference.154 The US Model might be a good guide for future 
China-Africa BITs as it is evidently a function of significant 

153. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2004 United States Model BIT art. 
13, [hereinafter US 2004 Model BIT] available at http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/
Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf. Article 13 
reads: 
Article 13: Investment and Labor 
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by 
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic labor laws. 
Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or 
otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such 
laws in a manner that weakens or reduces adherence to the internationally 
recognized labor rights referred to in paragraph 2 as an encouragement for 
the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in its 
territory. If a Party considers that the other Party has offered such an 
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the two 
Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement. 
2. For purposes of this Article, “labor laws” means each Party’s statutes or 
regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to the following 
internationally recognized labor 
rights: 
(a) the right of association; 
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; 
(d) labor protections for children and young people, including a 
minimum age for theemployment of children and the prohibition and 
elimination of the worst forms ofchild labor; and 
(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 
work,and occupational safety and health. 
154. IISD BIT Model, supra note 19, art. 21(D). (“All Parties shall ensure that 
their domestic law and policies are consistent with the core labor requirements of the 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights of Work, 1998.”). 
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compromises on all sides. The impact of more stringent labor 
standards on the flow of FDI is obvious but one improvement to 
the US Model expression that might be considered is the 
replacement of the more permissive “it is inappropriate” with “it 
is impermissible” or some such stronger standard. 
b. Environment 
A recent Financial Times article captured the dilemma 
between development and the environment very well when it 
touted “Chinese Investment: The money is welcome but more 
controls are needed.”155 The article quotes Xiao Yuhua, a 
research associate at the Zheijiang Normal University’s Institute 
of African Studies as saying: “it’s good for Africa to have Chinese 
companies investing. But it’s important to monitor and regulate 
them in order to avoid trouble and to create more 
opportunities.”156 
Environmental issues present a profound dilemma. A case 
in point is the controversy surrounding the building of the Gibe 
III dam on the Omo River in Southern Ethiopia. When 
completed, this US$1.75 billion dam is expected to generate 
1870 MW of power. As of 2009, this country of 80 million 
produced less than 1000 MW of power. 157 While this dam would 
literally more than double its capacity, almost all international 
financial institutions refused to provide financing, concerned 
about the environmental impact on indigenous populations 
living downstream and on Lake Turkana in neighboring 
Kenya.158 The Ethiopian government insisted that the benefits of 
the dam will more than offset the drawbacks and continued to 
build the dam with financial help from the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”) and expertise from the 
Italian construction firm, Salini.159 

155. Xan Rice, Chinese Investment: The Money Is Welcome But More Controls Are 
Needed, FIN. TIMES (London) (June 19, 2012, 10:02 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/d8f41dd6-b4a6-11e1-bb2e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2BZkdDfHe. 
156. Id. at 2. 
157. See id. at 1. 
158. See id. The financial institutions that refused financing include the African 
Development Bank (“ADB”), the World Bank, and the European Investment Bank. 
159. See id. 
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The concern appears to be that Chinese companies are 
much more willing to compromise on environmental standards 
than their Western counterparts because the latter faces closer 
scrutiny at home.160 Professor Ian Taylor of the University of St. 
Andrews in Scotland, after indicating the level of hypocrisy on 
the part of some Western investors such as oil companies, 
suggests that the environmental concerns in China’s Africa 
investment are real. But he also points out that the Chinese 
companies and government are increasingly becoming sensitive 
to their international reputation with this regard.161 Indeed, for 
the first time ever, during the November 2012 18th Congress of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party, President Hu 
Jintao announced “ecological progress” as being one of five 
cornerstones of China’s overall modernization drive alongside 
economic, political, social and cultural progress.162 He said in 
particular: “We must give high priority to making ecological 
progress and incorporate it into all aspects and the whole 
process of advancing economic, political, cultural, and social 
progress, work hard to build a beautiful country, and achieve 
lasting and sustainable development of the Chinese nation.”163 
Such high level political recognition and calls for 
incorporating environmental standards in all aspects of 
development clearly require the development and application of 
legal standards domestically and internationally. Legal standards 
enshrined in investment treaties are immensely helpful in 
resolving environmental issues because at the very least, they 
would define the rights and responsibilities of the host state and 
the investor and delineate expectations on both sides. Given the 
serious environmental concerns in the many areas of Chinese 
investment in Africa,164 defining the environmental standards in 
investment treaties is not only critical but also feasible and 
politically expedient given China’s increasing concern over 
environmental issues at home. None of the existing BITs do so. 

160. See id. 
161. See id. 
162. Hu Outlines “Overall Approach” for China’s Modernization Drive, Stresses Scientific 
Development, XINHUA NEWS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
special/18cpcnc/2012-11/08/c_131959824.htm 
163. Id. 
164. See Rice, supra note 155 (addressing concerns such as mining, hydroelectric 
power projects, illegal logging, and smuggling of ivory and rhino horns).  
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A look at the contemporary standards would be very important 
in crafting the acceptable levels of compromise. The new 2012 
US BIT Model’s environmental provision is elaborate—as such 
could be instructive.165 
Although it is still considered inadequate by many, this 
provision made significant changes to the previous BIT Model 
by adding paragraphs 3 to 7.166 Given the increasing seriousness 
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165. U.S. 2012 Model BIT, supra note 10, art. 12. Article 12 of the 2012 Model 
reads: 
Article 12: Investment and Environment 
1. The Parties recognize that their respective environmental laws and 
policies, and multilateral environmental agreements to which they are both 
party, play an important role in protecting the environment. 
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by 
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental 
laws. Accordingly, each Party shall ensure that it does not waive or otherwise 
derogate from or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from its environmental 
laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those 
laws, or fail to effectively enforce those laws through a sustained or recurring 
course of action or inaction, as an encouragement for the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, or retention of an investment in its territory. 
3. The Parties recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise 
discretion with respect to regulatory, compliance, investigatory, and 
prosecutorial matters, and to make decisions regarding the allocation of 
resources to enforcement with respect to other environmental matters 
determined to have higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties understand 
that a Party is in compliance with paragraph 2 where a course of action or 
inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a 
bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources. 
. . . . 
5. Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with 
this Treaty that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in 
its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. 
6. A Party may make a written request for consultations with the other Party 
regarding any matter arising under this Article. The other Party shall respond 
to a request for consultations within thirty days of receipt of such request. 
Thereafter, the Parties shall consult and endeavor to reach a mutually 
satisfactory resolution.”). 
7. The Parties confirm that each Party may, as appropriate, provide 
opportunities for public participation regarding any matter arising under this 
Article. 
Id. 
166. Compare id., with U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 153, art 12. Article 12 of 
the 2004 Model reads: 
Article 12: Investment and Environment 
1. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by 
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental 
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of environmental concerns, its inadequacy appears clear when 
compared with the IISD Model, which contains a more robust 
environmental provision.167 
The IISD Model has many features that make it more 
suitable for China-Africa relations. First, unlike many other 
models, including the latest US Model, it links investment with 
sustainable development of the host state. Although this is not a 
strange notion in international investment law,168 its expression 
here is very instructive. Sustainability is vitally important to 
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laws.12 Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or 
otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such 
laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections afforded in those 
laws as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or 
retention of an investment in its territory. If a Party considers that the other 
Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations with 
the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any 
such encouragement. 
2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with 
this Treaty that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in 
its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.” 
167. IISD BIT Model, supra note 19, art. 21. It reads in pertinent part: 
Article 21: Minimum standards for environmental, labour and human 
rights protection 
(A) Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own level of 
domestic environmental protection and its own sustainable development 
policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify its environmental laws and 
regulations, each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for 
high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to 
improve those laws and regulations. 
(B) Each Party shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high 
levels of labour and human rights protection appropriate to its economic and 
social situation, and shall strive to continue to improve these laws and 
regulations. 
(C) All Parties shall have, as a soon as practicable, a domestic 
environmental impact assessment law and social impact assessment law that 
meets the minimum standards adopted by the Conference of the Parties on 
these matters. 
. . . . 
(E) All parties shall ensure that their laws, policies and actions are 
consistent with the international human rights agreements to which they are 
a Party and, at a minimum, as soon as practicable with the list of human 
rights obligations and agreements to be adopted by the first meeting of the 
Parties.” 
Id. 
168. See, e.g., Salini Construttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609, 622 (2003). 
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Africa. As indicated above, Chinese companies have large scale 
investments in the extractive industries where environmental 
issues are likely to lead to serious contentions. A clear 
expression of expectations is essential. Second, it requires the 
parties to improve their environmental laws and regulations. In 
other words, it jointly holds them to higher environmental 
standards. That is particularly important in China-Africa 
relations where the development of environmental laws and the 
mechanisms of their enforcement may not be as developed as in 
the United States and other Western countries. The inclusion of 
such environmental requirements in BITs that China signs with 
African states is doubly beneficial because it helps China 
improve its laws, which could be applied to foreign investors in 
China, and also helps African states improve their 
environmental laws to protect their environment without 
imposing unreasonable restrictions that are not equally 
recognized in China. Finally, it sets minimum standards by 
linking the environmental regulations to recognized human 
rights standards. This is particularly important in projects that 
affect large numbers of indigenous communities. 
c. Corruption and Transparency 
China and all African states with the exception of Botswana 
have a failing mark on Transparency International’s (“TI”) 
public sector corruption perception index.169 All of Africa’s 
traditional partners from the West seem to have reasonably 
weakened the public corruption plague.170 According to the 
World Bank, public officials take about US$1 trillion in bribes 
every year with another US$1.5 trillion dollars paid to unduly 
influence procurement decisions.171 It is fair to assume that 
much of that money comes from western multinationals but it is 
also clear that Chinese companies are increasing their share on 
that front. For example, a recent TI report ranks Chinese firms 

169. While China ranks 80th, most African states rank below that. See Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/
results 
170. See id. All western European countries, Canada and the United States rank 
very well on the scale. 
171. Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through International 
Law in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL IN’T’L L.J. 691, 692 & n.4 (2007). 
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towards the bottom of the transparency scale. Out of the world’s 
105 largest companies on the ranking scale, the highest ranked 
Chinese company claimed the sixty-ninth spot.172 Out of twenty-
four major financial firms, the bottom three spots were taken by 
Chinese banks, namely, China Construction Bank Corp, Bank of 
Communications Co., and Bank of China Ltd. The total value of 
all the ranked firms is approximately US$11 trillion.173 The 
Chinese news source that carried the report concluded: “In the 
anti-corruption program rankings (100 percent indicating full 
transparency), the transparency of Bank of China and Bank of 
Communications was 0 percent . . . .”174 Indeed, European 
business partners also complain about the opacity of Chinese 
business culture. For example, the European Ambassador to 
China recently said that “Europe’s trade with China is being 
stymied by barriers including a lack of transparency and opaque 
business environment.”175 
Public perception surveys in China also rate the business 
sector as the most corrupt sector followed by the police.176 On 
the question of which country’s businesses are more likely to 
bribe abroad (i.e., bribe payers index) out of the twenty-eight 
largest FDI exporters, China ranked second to last, next only to 
Russia.177 Although TI does not have a bribe receiver’s index, 
based on rankings on the perception of public corruption 
index, it is easy to see that most African countries would rank 
high on the receiving end.178 As far as transparency and 
corruption is concerned, therefore, based on these reports, 
China-Africa business deals appear to be particularly vulnerable 
to corruption, which presents great obstacles to successful, long-

172. Qu Yi, Report Shows Chinese Banks Lack Transparency, CHINA.ORG.CN (July 13, 
2012), http://www.china.org.cn/business/2012-07/13/content_25903847.htm. 
173. See id. 
174. Id. The full interactive index is available at Visualising the Bribe Payers Index 
2011, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/interactive/ (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2014) (listing the Netherlands as the least likely to bribe, the United 
States at number 10, and South Africa at 15 on the 1 to 28 scale).  
175. Richard Quest, Unlocking China’s business potential, CNN (June 28, 2012, 3:24 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/world/europe/europe-eu-china-trade/
index.html. 
176. Fighting Corruption in China, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Nov. 8, 2012), 
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/fighting_corruption_in_china 
177. Id. 
178. See generally Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, supra note 169. 
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lasting, broadly, and mutually beneficial partnership. For the 
economic relations to mature and take proper root, the 
investment legal framework has to address the issue of 
corruption and transparency in a meaningful way. 
The political will to address this important issue appears to 
be present. As a recent Financial Times editorial noted, “Libya 
and Sudan show that the days when Beijing could be indifferent 
to corrupt or dysfunctional government in Africa are over.”179 
Indeed, during the 18th National Congress of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (“CPC”), President 
Hu Jintao said “If we fail to handle this issue [corruption] well, 
it could prove fatal to the Party, and even cause the collapse of 
the Party and the fall of the state.”180 Significantly, a February 
2011 amendment to the Chinese Criminal Code expressly makes 
the offering of bribes to foreign public officials for the purpose 
of acquiring “illegitimate business benefits” criminal conduct, 
punishable by law.181 
Although corruption is difficult to define and even more so 
to verify, its negative impacts on investment and economic 
progress are without dispute.182 Today, multinational 
corporations and their hosts are constrained by a patchwork of 
domestic and international legal instruments.183 The principal 
one is the United Nations Convention against Corruption.184 
China and nearly all African states have ratified this 

179. Editorial, China into Africa, FIN. TIMES (July 19, 2012, 7:20 PM) 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80ac1cd8-d1a6-11e1-bbbc-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz2BZkdDfHe. 
180. CPC Pledges Unremitting Efforts to Combat Corruption, XINHUA NEWS (Nov. 8, 
2012, 10:38 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/08/
c_131959538.htm. 
181. For a good description of Chinese anti-bribery laws including recent 
amendments, see ANTI-CORRUPTION REGULATION IN 51 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 58–
64 (Homer E. Moyer Jr. ed., 2011), available at http://www.squiresanders.com/files/
Publication/bc0b156f-f1de-4eb1-9553-9a35e5e43a44/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/c0a57610-6e13-49af-8df2-9d911d146dc2/AC2011%20China.pdf. 
182. Snider & Kidane, supra note 171, at 695–96. 
183. For a detailed discussion of domestic and international anti-corruption legal 
instruments in comparative context, see id. at 700–15. 
184. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Oct. 7, 2003). 
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convention.185 Although its implementation presents enormous 
challenges, the standards it sets are useful for China-Africa 
investment treaties. The term corruption does not appear in the 
latest US BIT Model; however, the IISD Model has duly 
incorporated the basic standards of the UN anti-Corruption 
Convention in Article 13,186 and adds some more beneficial 
standards.187 Article 32 of the same model also obligates the 
home states to adopt and enforce laws criminalizing the same 
conduct when done by their citizens—natural as well as 
juridical.188 
The inclusion of these provisions is not only important but 
also easy to do in any future China-Africa investment treaties 
because these are not new obligations as China and almost all 
African states have already assumed the same obligations under 

185. U.N. Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 
29 November 2013, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (entered into force Dec. 14, 2005). The 
exceptions are Chad, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan. Id. 
186. Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. [IISD], IISD Model International Agreement 
on Investment for Sustainable Development art. 13 (Apr. 2005). It reads: 
(A) Investors and their investments shall not, prior to the establishment of 
an investment or afterwards, offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or 
other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a public 
official of the host state, for that official or for a third party, in order that the 
official or third party act or refrain from acting in relation to the 
performance of official duties, in order to achieve any favor in relation to a 
proposed investment or any licenses, permits, contracts or other rights in 
relation to an investment. 
(B) Investors and their investments shall not be complicit in any act 
described in Paragraph (A), including incitement, aiding and abetting, and 
conspiracy to commit or authorization of such acts. 
187. Id. art. 22. It reads: 
All host states shall ensure that  
(A) the offering, solicitation or acceptance of an offer, promise or gift of 
any pecuniary or other nature, whether directly or through intermediaries, to 
any public official of the host state, for that official or for a third party, in 
order that the official or third party act or refrain from acting in relation to 
the performance of official duties to achieve any favor in relation to a 
proposed investment or any licenses, permits, contracts or other rights in 
relation to an investment; and 
(B) any acts complicit in any act described in Paragraph (A), including 
incitement, aiding and abetting, conspiracy to commit or authorization of 
such acts; shall be made criminal offences in the host state and subject to 
appropriate criminal enforcement and sanctions. Host states shall make every 
effort to prosecute such activities in accordance with domestic law. 
188. Id. art. 32. 
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the UN Convention.189 Their inclusion in investment treaties has 
several advantages, however: first, it reminds and reinforces the 
obligations on all sides, and second, perhaps more importantly, 
it facilitates the enforcement of the obligations as a part of 
investor-state dispute settlement. If, for example, a host state 
fails to prosecute a public official who solicits a bribe from an 
investor, the investor could potentially seek redress for violation 
of the anti-corruption provisions in the investment treaty. 
The US Model contains elaborate provisions on 
transparency; however, the concerns these provisions address 
are somewhat different from directly fighting the kind of 
corruption that the IISD Model envisions. The US Model’s 
transparency concern is basically transparency in rulemaking 
and adjudication of matters that potentially affect foreign 
investment, i.e., publication of laws and decisions affecting 
investment.190 Although transparency of such kind is absolutely 
essential for conducive business environment, as far as China-
Africa investment relations are concerned, the more acute 
problem, which is not covered by other provisions, would be the 
kind of corruption that the IISD Model addresses. 
d. Corporate Social Responsibility 
The term “corporate social responsibility” does not appear 
in any of the US BIT Models and the most recent one is no 
exception. The IISD Model contains a provision that defines 
corporate social responsibility in very broad terms.191 This 

189. As indicated above, Chinese domestic criminal code criminalizes the offering 
of bribe to foreign public officials, which is the corner stone of the UN anti-corruption 
Convention. Most of the African states are also parties to the African anti-corruption 
Convention. U.N. Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as 
of 29 November 2013, supra note 185. For a discussion of this convention, see Snider & 
Kidane, supra note 171, at 711–15. 
190. U.S. 2012 Model BIT, supra note 10, arts. 10–11. 
191. IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable 
Development, supra note 186, art. 16(A)-(C). The pertinent part reads: 
(A) In addition to the obligation to comply with all applicable laws and 
regulations of the host state and the obligations in this Agreement, and in 
accordance with the size, capacities and nature of an investment, and taking 
into account the development plans and priorities of the host state, the 
Millennium Development Goals and the indicative list of key responsibilities 
provided in Annex F, investors and their investments should strive to make 
the maximum feasible contributions to the sustainable development of the 
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provision incorporates the ILO Tripartite Declaration on 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy192 and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.193 
Admittedly, the IISD Model is too broad to include in a 
negotiated BIT. The OECD Guidelines, which are non-binding, 
contain principles in such areas as human rights, employment 
and industrial relations, the environment, corruption, consumer 
interest, science and technology, competition, and taxation.194 
It might be difficult to agree on the details of all of these 
areas in investment treaties, however, the minimum standards in 
the area of labor, the environment, and corruption and 
transparency discussed in sections a, b and c above are vital in 
any future China-Africa investment treaties. China and Africa 
negotiations must also be informed by the maturing ILO and 
OECD Guidelines as suggested by the IISD Model. Indeed, the 
Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China Africa 
Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015) expressly 
promises that “The Chinese government will continue to guide 
Chinese enterprises to actively fulfill social responsibilities and 
give back to the local communities.”195 These promises need at 
some point be written into binding treaties in a mutually 
acceptable manner. 

host state and local community through high levels of socially responsible 
practices.  
(B) Investors should apply the ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, as well as specific or sectoral standards of responsible practice 
where these exist. 
(C) Where standards of corporate social responsibility increase, investors 
should strive to apply and achieve the higher level standards.” 
192. Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (4th ed. 2006), available at http://
www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm. 
193. Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/
guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/48004323.pdf. 
194. See id. (defining the relevant scope of these concepts). 
195. Fifth FOCAC Action Plan, supra note 43. 
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e. Dispute Settlement 
Dispute settlement is a key component of investment 
treaties because in many cases, domestic judicial systems are not 
well equipped to resolve investor-state disputes reliably, 
neutrally, equitably, and definitively. As discussed in Part II.B.4 
above, the dispute settlement provisions in China-Africa BITs 
have evolved from domestic court litigation in the host state with 
only the quantum of compensation potentially referred to ad 
hoc arbitration,196 to open access, for both the host state and 
investor, to international arbitration, ad hoc or institutional, 
including ICSID without limitation of the subject matter197 at the 
discretion of the investor.198 
The dispute settlement provisions in these BITs had for 
decades largely lain dormant because the scale and magnitude 
of Chinese investment in Africa were not so high as to produce 
too many disputes requiring formal resolution. As Chinese 
investments in Africa increase and mature, disputes will also 
undoubtedly increase. There is no doubt that many disputes are 
already emerging out of Chinese investments made in the last 
decade. A mutually acceptable and effective dispute settlement 
mechanism is absolutely essential. The dispute resolution 
mechanisms contained in the existing BITs are fragmented and 
lack proper guidance to the investor as well as the host state. 
The existing levels and prospects of Chinese investment in 
Africa require an ingenious, mutually beneficial, culturally 
appropriate, and dynamic dispute resolution mechanism. 
At this point in time, saying that international arbitration is 
a better means of investment dispute settlement is stating the 
obvious when the alternative is domestic court litigation. 
Working out the details of international arbitration is the more 
difficult question. This question is more acute for China and 
Africa for the following reasons. First, international investment 
arbitration as a modern means of transnational dispute 
resolution has developed in North-South relations predicated on 
western legal thought. Its Washington-London-Paris-Stockholm 

196. See, e.g., China-Ghana BIT, supra note 97, art. 10. 
197. See, e.g., China-Ethiopia BIT, supra note 97, art. 9. 
198. See. e.g., China-Madagascar BIT, supra note 97, art. 10. 
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roots and modus operandi are unmistakable.199 Those venues 
are still the custodians of the important institutions and 
expertise. China and all African states are cultural strangers to 
these venues.200 The venues, as mere physical locations alone, 
may not present serious difficulties; the problem lies in the lack 
of proper representation of both China and Africa on the 
arbitral panels and other important secretariat positions in 
almost all of these institutions.201 That raises the more important 
question of whether ICSID or the other leading arbitral 
institutions in their current compositions are suitable fora for 
China-Africa investment dispute settlement. As one of the 
writers concluded elsewhere based on a border inquiry, the 
existing institutions have significant shortcomings in handling 
China-Africa investment disputes in a neutral, cost-effective, and 
culturally appropriate manner.202 For example, as far as ICSID is 
concerned, which is the most relevant institution for purposes of 
investment disputes, a look at its half-a-century of arbitral justice 
shows its quintessentially North-South stature. The publically 
available ICSID statistics tell the whole story: while more than 
twenty percent of all ICSID cases involved African States,203 only 
two percent of the arbitrators and conciliators have been from 
Sub-Saharan Africa.204 By contrast, about seventy percent of all 
the arbitrators, conciliators and ad hoc committee members 
have been West Europeans or North Americans while the 
number of Western European respondents in these proceedings 

199. The leading institutions are ICSID, the London Court of International 
Arbitration (“LCIA”), see LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARBITRATION, http://
www.lcia.org/ (last visited May 1, 2014); the Court of Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), see COURT OF ARBITRATION OF THE INT’L CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr (last 
visited May 1, 2014); and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”), see 
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.chamber.se/the-scc-institute.aspx 
(last visited May 1, 2014). 
200. See KIDANE, supra note 8, at 270–393 (detailing the law, cultures, and 
economics of the world’s leading arbitral institutions and the position of China and 
Africa). 
201. See id. (providing useful statistics and citations for each profiled institution). 
202. Id. at 393. 
203. ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD—STATISTICS 11 (2012) [hereafter ICSID 2012 
Statistics], available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType
=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=
English31. 
204. Id. at 16. 
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has been less than one percent.205 Having not participated in 
ICSID proceedings for years, in recent times, China appears to 
be taking part in a few cases. For example, a Chinese insurance 
group has recently initiated an arbitral proceeding against 
Belgium.206 Based on the limited information available, it is 
interesting to note that the Chinese company is represented by 
Kirkland & Ellis International out of London and Chicago, and 
the two arbitrators appointed so far are from England and New 
Zealand.207 
It is not fair to attribute a serious lack of diversity to all 
other western institutions—especially the International 
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”). According to the most recent 
ICC statistical report, in 2011, it received about 796 cases from 
139 countries. Hearings were conducted in 63 countries, and 
about 78 nationalities were represented in arbitral panels.208 Be 
that as it may, the cultural and other barriers that China and 
Africa would face in the West are still undeniable. A simple look 
at the composition of even the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration shows no Chinese and only one African out of 
eighteen members.209 To the extent these institutions make a 
conscious effort to address the democracy and cultural deficit, 
they could be suitable on a case by case basis, however, China 
and Africa must also consider the alternative of designing their 
own institution particularly for the resolution of investment 
disputes, which often involve vital issues of public concern. 
As one of the authors suggested in more detail elsewhere,210 
an arbitral institution within the framework of FOCAC could be 
particularly suitable. While the details need to be negotiated, 
once an agreement is made on the nature, location and 

205. Id. at 11, 16. 
206. Ping An Life Ins. Co. of China, Ltd. & Ping An Ins. (Grp.) Co. of China, Ltd. 
v. Kingdom of Belg., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29 (Feb. 26, 2013). 
207. Id. Further information is available on ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet. 
208. The ICC Report itself is subscription based (US$1200), but a summary of the 
statistics is available on the ICC Website at Statistics, INT’L CHAMBER COM., 
http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/
Introduction-to-ICC-Arbitration/Statistics (last visited April 9, 2014). 
209. List of Court Members, Int’l Chamber Com., http://www.iccwbo.org/About-
ICC/Organization/Dispute-Resolution-Services/ICC-International-Court-of-
Arbitration/List-of-Current-Court-Members (last visited April 9, 2014). 
210. Kidane, supra note 8, ch. 15. 
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procedures of this FOCAC institution, China and African states 
could begin referencing it in their future investment treaties as 
an alternative forum for dispute settlement. Along the lines of 
the IISD Model, the most important characteristics of the 
FOCAC affiliated institution must include escalation procedures 
where alternatives to binding arbitration are adequately 
explored. Other considerations must include the location of the 
subject matter of the dispute in selecting the seat, diversity and 
proper cultural representation on the panels, transparency, 
appellate discipline, and effective mechanism of enforcement.211 
A dispute settlement body imbued with these features under the 
auspices of FOCAC could provide a good alternative in China-
Africa investment relations. The details would obviously need to 
be negotiated. 
CONCLUSION 
China and Africa face extraordinary challenges in ordering 
their economic relations—particularly their investment 
relations—by law. This Article has outlined several of these 
challenges. These challenges may be summarized as follows: 
first, through a complex mix of historical circumstances, they 
have been required to adapt and utilize normative and 
institutional apparatus created for a different purpose i.e., 
North-South, more specifically, West-East, West-Africa, and West-
Latin America relations. Second, the problem of adaptability has 
been exasperated by fundamental doctrinal and cultural 
differences. More specifically, in terms of doctrinal diversity, 
whereas Chinese and most African societies largely maintain a 
different understanding of the function of private property, they 
are confronted with investment norms imbued with classic 
western ideologies. While on the one hand, they recognize that 
these norms have a history of success in ordering economic 
relations, on the other hand, they are confronted with the 
economic inequities enabled by the same norms. To make 
matters worse, there is more than a grain of suspicion between 
them that the stronger party might be desirous of employing 
such norms to its advantage. At the cultural level, while the 
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211. As far as enforcement is concerned, both the ICSID and New York 
Convention models could be instructive. 
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preference for harmony and non-binding soft norms pervades 
both the Chinese and most African legal cultures, through 
decades of interaction with the West, they have come to 
appreciate the virtues of predictability and uniformity that 
binding norms often bring. Their dilemma on this front is more 
acute when it comes to dispute settlement. Whereas the total 
allocation of blame rather than the restoration of order and 
harmony as the objective of dispute settlement is something that 
they have struggled to internalize down through the decades, 
they also recognize that pragmatism in today’s business 
environment might demand adaptability to cross cultural 
notions and dominant means of resolution of disputes. It is with 
this background that this Article recommends the systematic 
revision and adoption of a modern and mutually beneficial and 
culturally appropriate China-African investment regime backed 
by a robust dispute settlement mechanism. 
The existing BITs have significant shortcomings—indeed, 
they are all outdated. This conclusion includes the third 
generation of Chinese BITs exemplified by the China-
Madagascar BIT discussed above. In short, the first two 
generations are outdated because they are not informed by 
modern developments in such areas as scope and admission, 
treatment, expropriation, dispute settlement, but more 
importantly, they totally omit prescriptions in such fundamental 
areas as labor, environment, corruption and transparency and 
generally corporate social responsibility. The last model is also 
already outdated for many of the above reasons but more 
curiously, it is outdated because it has some notable hallmarks of 
a North-South BIT, which could be a troubling trend. For 
China-Africa investment relations to overcome the challenges 
and continue the current trajectories of growth unhampered, 
their investment treaties must not ignore contemporary norms 
that link investment to sustainable development. They must also 
critically appraise the shortcomings of the existing mechanisms 
of dispute settlement and seriously consider an alternative 
mutually acceptable and culturally appropriate institutional 
mechanism for the resolution of their disputes.  
  
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